Create a position (deploy a collateral vault)
GET/v1/actions/twyne/create-position
Deploy the borrower's collateral vault, choosing its liquidation LTV. This is the first step on Twyne — there is no "first deposit opens it" path, and the standard lending ops refuse an account that has no vault in the market.
Twyne is a credit-delegation layer over Aave V3 and Euler V2, not a lending market of its own: capital never leaves the external protocol. Credit-LPs deposit a receipt token they already hold (eWETH, or a Twyne wrapper around an aToken) into an intermediate credit vault; a borrower deploys a collateral vault — one contract per position — that RESERVES that credit, so the external market sees one ordinary borrower while the user's own collateral carries a much higher LTV (93.26 % → 98 %).
Three consequences shape this API:
- A position is a contract, and there may be SEVERAL per user per market. Every op past the create takes an optional
posId(the collateral vault address); omitted, it resolves the account's only vault and refuses when there is more than one. Discovery isfactory.getCollateralVaults(borrower). - There is no per-market LTV. Each position carries its own
twyneLiqLTV, chosen at deploy time inside a live BAND:extLiqLTV × externalLiqBuffer ≤ chosen ≤ maxTwyneLTVs. Both bounds move — governance ramps the ceiling, and for a PT market the floor drifts as the collateral ages — so they are read fresh on every call and returned asdata.band. - The collateral is not all the borrower's.
totalAssetsDepositedOrReserved − maxRelease()is what a withdraw can pay out; the rest is reserved Credit-LP capital.
Every borrower op is an evc.call through Twyne's OWN EVC 0xef39D649…, never Euler's canonical one. Liquidation is by INHERITANCE — the liquidator becomes the borrower and heals the position — so there is no seize-and-sell penalty auction.
liqLtv is validated against a LIVE band read and is refused above the ceiling, below the floor, or against collateral that has already MATURED (two of the three PT markets are expired — existing positions there stay actionable, new ones are not opened).
The vault's address is not returned: it is only knowable once the deploy has executed, which the response states as data.vaultAddressKnownAfterExecution. Read it from the T_CollateralVaultCreated event in the receipt, or from factory.getCollateralVaults(account) afterwards. A single batch that creates AND funds the position needs the address up front — that is evc.batchSimulation, not a pinned CREATE2 hash, because the hash is a property of the factory implementation and that has already changed four times.
Plain-text reference — GET /v1/actions/twyne/create-position
Parameters
| Parameter | In | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
chainId | query | string | yes | Chain id See the ChainId schema for the full set of supported chains. |
lender | query | string | yes | Per-market key, e.g. TWYNE_1_<INTERMEDIATE_VAULT>_<TARGET_ASSET> See the LenderId schema for the full set of accepted values. |
operator | query | string | yes | Borrower (tx sender) |
liqLtv | query | string | yes | The position's liquidation LTV, 1e4 scale (e.g. 9500 = 95 %). Must sit inside the market's live band, returned as data.band |
Response 200
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
success | True | |
data | object | Informational data (quotes, simulation results, etc.) |
actions | object | Transaction calldata and approvals. Null for quote-only responses (no account provided). |
actions.transactions | object[] | Pre-trade setup transactions (e.g. e-mode switch, collateral enable). Execute these before the main swap. Empty when no setup is needed. |
actions.transactions[].chainType | evm | Which VM executes this step. ABSENT means evm, which is the only value any endpoint returns today — every EVM response is unchanged. A non-EVM chain would return a different shape (a serialized, PERISHABLE transaction rather than to/data/value) carrying its own chainType, so a client that wants to stay forward-compatible should branch on this field rather than assume to is present. |
actions.transactions[].to | string | Target contract address |
actions.transactions[].data | string | Encoded calldata |
actions.transactions[].value | string | ETH value to send with the transaction |
actions.transactions[].description | string | Human-readable label. For alternatives, this is the aggregator name (e.g. "Paraswap"). For transactions, describes the setup action (e.g. "Switch e-mode to 1"). |
actions.alternatives | object[] | DEX aggregator swap transactions sorted by best output (descending). Each entry's description is the aggregator name. The client should pick one to execute. Present on loop action endpoints. |
actions.alternatives[].chainType | evm | Which VM executes this step. ABSENT means evm, which is the only value any endpoint returns today — every EVM response is unchanged. A non-EVM chain would return a different shape (a serialized, PERISHABLE transaction rather than to/data/value) carrying its own chainType, so a client that wants to stay forward-compatible should branch on this field rather than assume to is present. |
actions.alternatives[].to | string | Target contract address |
actions.alternatives[].data | string | Encoded calldata |
actions.alternatives[].value | string | ETH value to send with the transaction |
actions.alternatives[].description | string | Human-readable label. For alternatives, this is the aggregator name (e.g. "Paraswap"). For transactions, describes the setup action (e.g. "Switch e-mode to 1"). |
actions.permissions | object[] | Approval/delegation transactions that must execute before both transactions and alternatives. Includes ERC20 allowances (targeting the composer contract) and lender borrow/withdrawal delegations (targeting the lending protocol contract directly). Filtered against on-chain state so only missing approvals are returned. Null when no approvals are needed. |
actions.permissions[].to | string | Target contract address |
actions.permissions[].data | string | Encoded calldata |
actions.permissions[].value | string | ETH value |
actions.permissions[].description | string | Human-readable description of the approval (e.g. "Approve borrow for AAVE_V3", "Approve ERC20") |
actions.permissions[].spender | string | ERC-20 approve spender (x-chain permissions). Match it against the selected quote's approvalTarget — several bridges can share one spender, so do not match by description. |
actions.permissions[].type | ERC20, Lender | What kind of grant this is. A signatures[] offer names the type it replaces via its replaces field. |
actions.signatures | object[] | EIP-712 payloads the user can sign INSTEAD of sending the corresponding permissions entry. Only present when the caller opted in with permit=auto|required and a permit path exists. Sign with eth_signTypedData_v4, then POST the same endpoint with {permits: [{permitId, signature}]} (plus builds where the response issued buildIds) — the permit executes inside the main transaction. |
actions.signatures[].permitId | string | Opaque, self-describing handle for this permit. Round-trip it verbatim: POST {permits: [{permitId, signature}]} back to the same endpoint. |
actions.signatures[].kind | erc2612, dai, permit2, aaveCredit, morphoAuth, cometAuth | Permit flavour |
actions.signatures[].typedData | object | Ready for eth_signTypedData_v4 (domain, types incl. EIP712Domain, primaryType, message). All numeric fields are decimal strings. |
actions.signatures[].replaces | string | Which permissions entry this signature replaces (ERC20 | Lender) |
actions.signatures[].spender | string | Who the signature authorises. Match against the permission / quote (approvalTarget) it replaces — on multi-spender responses (x-chain) only routes whose approvalTarget equals this spender are covered by the signature. |
actions.signatures[].description | string | Human-readable label for this entry. |
actions.signatures[].unscoped | boolean | True when the grant is NOT amount-scoped (full position control until revoked) — surface this to the user. |
actions.signatures[].deadline | string | Unix seconds after which the signature is worthless (default: 30 minutes). |
actions.permitSkipped | object[] | Why a permit was NOT offered for a permission, when one was asked for (permit=auto|required). The corresponding approve transaction stands. |
actions.permitSkipped[].replaces | string | Which permission kind stays a transaction (ERC20 | Lender) |
actions.permitSkipped[].reason | string |
Example response
{
"success": true,
"data": {},
"actions": {
"transactions": [
{
"chainType": "evm",
"to": "0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2",
"data": "0x617ba037000000000000000000000000c02aaa39b2",
"value": "0",
"description": "string"
}
],
"alternatives": [
{
"chainType": "evm",
"to": "0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2",
"data": "0x617ba037000000000000000000000000c02aaa39b2",
"value": "0",
"description": "string"
}
],
"permissions": [
{
"to": "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2",
"data": "0x617ba037000000000000000000000000c02aaa39b2",
"value": "0",
"description": "string",
"spender": "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2",
"type": "ERC20"
}
],
"signatures": [
{
"permitId": "string",
"kind": "erc2612",
"typedData": {},
"replaces": "string",
"spender": "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2",
"description": "string",
"unscoped": true,
"deadline": "string"
}
],
"permitSkipped": [
{
"replaces": "string",
"reason": "string"
}
]
}
}
Request
Responses
- 200
- 400
- 429
- 500
- 502
Create-position transaction + the validated band
Validation error
Rate limited. Unauthenticated callers share a per-IP budget; send an x-api-key header to lift it. Retry with exponential backoff.
Unexpected server error. Safe to retry with backoff.
An upstream data source or protocol origin failed (error.code is ORIGIN_FAILED). error.details carries the per-origin status. This is also what a missing or malformed required parameter currently returns, rather than a 400.